The Next Middle East War

The next Middle East war–Israel against genocidal Islamism–has begun.

So writes Yossi Klein Halevi in his article for The National Review. And he expects it to be a long war, extending for months or even years with temporary lulls along the way as Israel battles Iran’s two proxies, Hamas and Hizbullah–enemies attacking from the 2 areas that Israel abandoned.

But while the Israeli right views this as proof of the flawed approach of unilateralism, Halevi still stands by it:

Those of us who have supported unilateralism didn’t expect a quiet border in return for our withdrawal but simply the creation of a border from which we could more vigorously defend ourselves, with greater domestic consensus and international understanding. The anticipated outcome, then, wasn’t an illusory peace but a more effective way to fight the war. The question wasn’t whether Hamas or Hezbollah would forswear aggression but whether Israel would act with appropriate vigor to their continued aggression.

Instead, Israel’s leadership failed to follow through on their assurances and respond forcefully–allowing the near-daily Kassam rockets to be launched from Gaza with no meaningful response. Till now.

But the issue is more than just a failure to provide the promised response to terrorist attacks–if Halevi is correct in the goal of Israeli unilateralism in general and the Disengagement in particular, then there was a major failure to communicate it both inside and outside Israel.Joel Mowbray writes from Israel that

the reason ordinary, otherwise apolitical Israelis supported Gaza disengagement last year had nothing to do with Oslo-era delusions that peace was possible. Israelis simply want an end to the prolonged “negotiations” which never really lead anywhere. Unilateral disengagement was sold and supported on the idea that there was no partner with whom to negotiate, so Israel would just pull out to end the headache once and for all. It offered at least the hint of a promise of “normalcy.”

There were those who saw the Disengagement, combined with the Security Fence, as a way to simply separate Israel from the Palestinian Arabs and the terrorist threat.

But in the end, the real enemy that Israel will finally have to deal with is neither Hamas nor Hizbollah but the force behind them–Iran, a showdown all the more inevitable as Iran grows closer towards achieving nuclear capability. According to Halevi
to a very senior military source with whom I’ve spoken, Israel is still hoping that an international effort will stop a nuclear Iran; if that fails, then Israel is hoping for an American attack. But if the Bush administration is too weakened to take on Iran, then, as a last resort, Israel will have to act unilaterally. And, added the source, Israel has the operational capability to do so.

Back in May, I posted an article with some opinions on both sides as to whether Israel had the capapbility to deal with Iran’s nuclear threat and an account by someone who trained Israeli pilots who compares them with Iranian pilots.

But in the meantime, there remains Hamas and Hizbollah. Halevi mentions the need for the “destruction of the Hamas regime and the dismantling of the Hezbollah infrastructure.” While the destruction of Hamas might be feasible, that is not the case in Lebanon, where Hizbollah is a more integrated political entity and has far greater firepower.

An article by Patrick Devenny of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. in the Middle East Quarterly, Hezbollah’s Strategic Threat to Israel, details the extent of Hizbollah’s capabilities–their threat, how Hizbollah would attack, and what defenses Israel has. According to the article:

While Hezbollah would launch its rockets with the goal of causing mass casualties to shock and demoralize the Israeli population, they would also likely attempt smaller but more devastating infrastructure assaults. High-value targets would include the industrial section of Haifa, whose sprawling petrochemical plants and oil refinery would be vulnerable to bombardment. The loss of the Haifa refinery, one of only two such installations in Israel, would threaten Israel’s economic security. Hezbollah could also launch rockets against the city’s port and Matam Park, a hub of Israeli high-tech development. Even minor damage could lead to serious disruptions in Israel’s delicate economic framework. The vulnerability of the Israeli economy to a Hezbollah rocket attack was demonstrated by events in 1996 when the group fired over 500 Katyushas into northern Israel; Israeli officials placed the cost of the relatively minor two-week assault at approximately US$100 million.

See also Israel Matzav on Hizbollah’s capabilities.

Devenny discusses Israel’s defenses, especially the Tactical High-Energy Laser program (THEL), which may not be available for the army till 2008. Instead, the best defense against what Hizbollah has would be a preemptive strike.

Devenny engages in a lot of theory and analysis.
Now we may see if he is right.