How To Deal With Terrorist Kidnappings

In their article for The Middle East Forum The Evolving Threat: International Terrorism in the post 9-11 Era, Michael Rubin and Suzanne Gershowitz discuss political strategies to counter acts of terrorism–including kidnapping.

Kidnapping has become a favorite tactic in part because acts of violence themselves are not as effective:

People have become inured to violence so the attacks do not get the same kinds of headlines.
Both and planning and execution of the attacks are difficult and costly.

Instead:

Kidnapping allows terrorists to bypass this dynamic. Hostage-taking extends media attention and allows reporters to humanize the victim. For journalists, an assassination or bombing is anti-climatic; the press only begins its coverage after the operation has ended. But uncertainty about whether a hostage remains alive creates the suspense necessary for a good story. Terrorists have repeatedly used videos of hostages pleading for their lives in order to seize headlines. The plight of freelance journalist Jill Carroll captivated audiences as each video is released and deadline passed.

The results have been everything that the terrorists could hope for, since the West has often caved and paid the ransoms that not only encourage more kidnappings but also provide the terrorists with the means to acquire better weapons. All this of course leads up to the inevitable question:

How then should Western governments respond to the seizure of hostages? With firmness calculated to defend the long-term safety of both their own citizens and Iraqis. Terrorists do not employ ineffective tactics. The key to defeating the scourge of kidnapping is to make it unprofitable. Sometimes long-term victory trumps short-term tragedy.

The problem is the blind belief that diplomacy and negotiation is capable of resolving any conflict. Hamas and Hezbollah are two examples, of many, where such a policy will not work. Both work from an undeviating ideology that by definition opposes any real dialogue in their goal to destroy Israel.

The answer according to Rubin and Gershowitz is

Ideologues ultimately must be marginalized to the point of impotence, isolated, or eliminated. …Rather than be treated as powerbrokers, Nasrallah and Hamas political bureau chief Khalid Mishaal should be international pariahs.

Terrorists, whether secular or religious, engage in terrorism for a simple reason: They find it a useful tactic. If the West is to defeat terror, it must raise the cost of terrorism beyond the endurance of terrorists.

They advocate using strong and forceful measures, such as one that Israel has already used on a number of occasions–targeted assassination–for a number of reasons:

In the short term, it disrupts the plans of the terrorists

In the long term, it weakens the terrorist organizations–o It creates power struggleso It makes terrorists careless when they rush to retaliate

According to this assessment, the Israeli government was at one point successful in raising the cost of terrorism beyond what the Palestinians could bare–it was only with the policy of unilateral disengagement that the cost of engaging in terrorism once again become worthwhile.
There are a number of instances outside of Israel that show the efficiency of a strong approach, and they are not limited to targeted assassinations:

After President Reagan sent an air strike against Libya in response to the Berlin disco bombing, Qadhafi reduced the level of terrorism launched against the West.

After Turkey staged military exercises along their border, the Syrian government stopped sheltering PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.

After a Turkish air strike on the Iranian border city of Piranshahr in 1999, Iran stopped using PKK fighters against the Turkey.

After the US ousted the Taliban, denying al-Qaeda a safe-haven and serving as a warning to other potential terror sponsors, there have been no further terrorist attacks on US soil.
If such a policy is not only logically but historically sound, why hasn’t the West made such an approach a regular part of their policy? Fear of creating a cycle of violence, of so stoking the fire of aggression that it spirals out of control.
Rubin and Gershowitz conclude:

Political leadership should be about protecting national security, not just winning popularity in the weekly opinion poll. Ultimately, investing in short-term force can win long-term security and contain the terrorist scourge. Democratic nations must not forget, though, that they are up against an international community that accommodates terrorists and blames the victims–Western democracies and Israel–for terrorists’ actions. If democracies do not defend their own legitimacy, no one will.

One issue not dealt with is collateral damage, the death of innocent civilians exploited with such efficiency, particularly by the Palestinian Arabs. It is not an issue taken lightly by the West and it has led Israel to twist herself into a pretzel when she has taken strong action against Palestinian terrorists–and has cost her the lives of many of her soldiers.

In Gaza Israel has, belatedly and not to the degree she is capable, started to use force and take the fight to Hamas and the terrorists. The larger question remains as to how far she can and is willing to go in taking the fight to Hizbollah.

Bottom line, there is nothing new being suggested. The major issue, the hurdle that needs to be overcome is one of attitude, a willingness to defend oneself and use all available options. The question is whether the West–and Israel–is willing.

Theodore Herzl famously said “If you will it, it is no dream.”

The corollary may well be: If you do not have the will, it is going to be a nightmare.
Based on the reports on Israel’s response to Hizbollah, the situation is closer to the former.