EISENHOWER PART 1

This series of 5 articles appeared on Israpundit written by Joseph Alexander Norland. I am printing them as part of a struggle to understand how the United States government has backed the PLO from the beginning and this backing continues to the very present in the Road Map and the Uprooting of Jews from Gaza and Northern Samaria...Felix Quigley June 30, 2005

1. Introduction and summary

This piece reviews Israel-US relations during the Eisenhower administration, January 1953-January 1961. The object is to highlight what has changed and what hasn't, and to derive relevant conclusions. In particular, I will attempt to describe what was wrong with the Eisenhower thinking, the erroneous policy steps that ensued, and what we can learn from these mistakes vis-a-vis the Bush-Sharon situation.

The material presented is based on numerous sources, chief among them being Alteras' monograph, "Eisenhower and Israel":
Alteras, Isaac. Eisenhower and Israel. Tallahassee (Florida): U Press of Florida, 1993
For this reason, page numbers cited below refer to Alteras' work. The responsibility for errors and interpretation rests with me alone.

It is hardly a secret that during the Eisenhower years, the relations between Israel and the US were (to put it mildly) extremely strained. Some contend that both Eisenhower and Dulles harboured a strong anti-Israel streak that manifested itself time an again in Israel-US relations. It is important, therefore, to recognize from the outset that prior to assuming office, both Eisenhower and Dulles were actually helpful to nascent Israel. Eisenhower, for example, was instrumental in ensuring that British and US legislators visited and witnessed the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps [p.29]. He was also helpful to Ben-Gurion in visiting the Displaced Persons (DP) camps after WW II, and in shipping Zionist educational materials from Palestine to these camps [p.29].

Eisenhower soon turned to oppose the birth of Israel for strategic reasons. Thus, prior to the establishment of Israel, Eisenhower was rather opposed to the US supporting the partition resolution of the UN. On the other hand, once Israel became a living fact, Eisenhower made peace with its existence, albeit grudgingly. For example, on 22 July 1951, as NATO's Europe commander, Eisenhower testifies at the senate foreign relations committee that the Middle East [ME] was the most important territory and "we should bring in the arab world on our side".

Dulles was very supportive of Israel even at her birth, when the 1946-47 UN debates were ongoing. Specifically, he supported the UN Partition Plan. When the catastrophic Bernadotte Plan was brought up at the UN on 21 September, 1948, George Marshall, head of the US delegation supported it; Dulles, his deputy, opposed it. On September 28, 1948, Dulles delivered a speech to that effect at the UN [p. 55-56]. This was in sharp contrast to the statement by George Marshall on Sept 21, according to which the US would accept the Bernadotte plan [p.6].
With this in mind, the questions arise: What caused the Eisenhower-Dulles policies to turn anti-Israel, and what are the manifestations that justify this characterization of the administration's Israel policy?

To answer these questions in detail would require an entire tome. To fit the essence into the limited space of a blog article, and to ensure that the statements I make are documented and easily verifiable, I will adopt the method of an annotated timeline, viz., I will provide dates and headlines for the major, relevant events, and add interpretative comments of my own [in italics].

In reading the detailed timelines presented in Parts 2 and 3, one should bear in mind that during the period January 1953 - January 1961, the world saw momentous political developments that had nothing to do with the Middle East (ME), and yet, as will be underscored below, Eisenhower and Dulles seemed to have been utterly fixated on this area and on Israel's "transgressions". A short, selected list of world events that took place during Eisenhower's administration is given in Part 4 of this essay.

The remainder of this Introduction outlines what I consider the main, recurring motifs which characterised the Israel-US relations, 1953-1961. This summary should benefit readers who are not interested in the flood of details that document my theses, as presented in Parts 2 and 3.
The first theme to emphasize is the obsessive fixation with which Eisenhower bludgeoned Israel on the one hand, and the awe-inspiring fortitude with which Ben-Gurion attempted to resist the US. In some aspects, Ben-Gurion was successful, as in the instance of rejecting US pressure to relinquish the Negev or accept refugees. In other instances, especially with regard to the withdrawal from Sinai after the 1956 War, Ben-Gurion was forced to surrender, but at least he put up a noble fight. This is, to my mind, the major difference between the Eisenhower years and the miserable Bush era: the steadfastness of Israel's leaders. This theme and the obvious conclusion it warrants are the most important part of this essay.

The second motif is the constant cycle of Arab aggression against Israel, especially against civilians, followed by Israeli retaliation, followed by condemnation of Israel at the hands of the US and/or the UN. Mostly, this condemnation was accompanied by economic pressure and using the UN (which the US was able to control in that era) to bludgeon Israel. In turn, Israel learnt very quickly that she had no friends to speak of, with the exception of France during the Suez War.

The third motif, one that is related to the foregoing, is the persistent attempt by Israel's Arab neighbours to sabotage Israel's economy, especially when the GOI attempted to develop the land. The water dispute is one example, the Arab boycott is another. The Arabs were quite willing to deprive themselves of the advantages that would accrue from co-operating with Israel, provided the Israelis too were deprived. This point, flowing from the Arab intention to destroy Israel, seems to have eluded Eisenhower.

The fourth motif is the Eisenhower/Dulles perception of Israel as a millstone around the West's neck. Needing the Arab oil for its well-being, and needing to deprive the USSR of control over this oil, the US policy mandated courting the Arabs at all costs, especially by severing the friendly relations with Israel, which prevailed during Truman's administration.

The fifth element is the Eisenhower-Dulles perception of "Zionist pressure" and "internal politics" which they resented quite overtly and publicly. Resisting the voice of the people and their representatives became another Eisenhower obsession. No such resentment was shown when the State Department Arabists and the oil interests lobbied for the Arabs. The achievement of the pro-Israel lobby in somewhat softening the Eisenhower-Dulles hard line on the "unconditional withdrawal" from the Sinai is truly remarkable. Today, Israel's supporters in the US are better organized and much more numerous, especially when one considers the Christian Zionists. But the current Israeli leaders fail to adequately marshal the potential of her supporters.

The sixth thread that characterises the Eisenhower era is the eagerness to clobber his allies - the UK, France and Israel - when the obvious gainer could be no other than the USSR.
Considering that the events documented below take their hue from the Cold War of that era, it is amazing how blind Eisenhower was to the fact that he kept weakening his allies. If removal of European influence in the ME was Eisenhower's objective, he sure triumphed in 1956-7, but at the cost of seeing Europe replaced by the USSR. The conclusion one has to draw from the specific events (as detailed in Parts 2 and 3), which illustrate this motif, is this: the US has proved to be an extremely unreliable ally.

The seventh recurring element to highlight is the fact that Eisenhower-Dulles obdurately refused to recognize facts, or act on such facts. Nasser was quite open and bold in working with the USSR, and in undermining the regimes that were anti-Communist: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq (prior to the 1958 coup). Yet, the US never ceased in attempting to find favour in Nasser's eyes, using the carrot of arms and aid to the Arabs and a club pointed at Israel. This amazing fact is documented thoroughly in the next two parts of the essay.

The eighths recurring motif is the quest of Israel for US arms and security guarantees, and the concomitant consistent refusal and rejection of Israel by the US. On the one hand, Eisenhower refused to guarantee Israeli security, or freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Suez, and on the other hand he refused to provide Israel with arms to defend herself. He also went as far as to constantly warn Israel against using force to press her claim for passage in the Straits and the Suez Canal. The result was that Israel had to survive with her hands tied behind her back, while the Arabs were skillfully playing the US against the USSR and bilking both.

The ninth element to underscore is the way Arabs negotiate. Rather than reject a proposal, they allow the negotiations to drag on, appearing to concede somewhat and agree in principle, only to draw an implied rejection at the last minute. The US negotiations with the Arabs on the Johnston water-sharing plan and on the Alpha Plan advocated by Anderson, are two examples detailed in the following text. The US, however, never tired of these tactics, and continued to negotiate ad nauseam.

The tenth element is one of omission rather than of commission. At no point did I find that Israeli negotiators made the point that the Jews were duped in 1921 when 78% of the land promised to them was removed to create a fiefdom for the Emir Abdullah; nor did Israeli negotiators emphasized that the Jews were duped a second time, when the western part of their homeland was allocated to an Arab state (the UN partition plan). Nor did they make the point that the Arab "refugees" were anything but. In a word, Israel did little to stake out the moral high ground. This is another issue that persists to this day.

Last but not least is the motif of the UN as a source of consistent anti-Israel action. The UN chiefs "on the ground", whether the Canadian Burns or the Danish Bennike, were perpetual sources of anti-Israel propaganda. When they did side with Israel in the Mixed Armistice Committees (MAC's), their support was utterly useless. The same goes for the Secretary General and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In short, the UN as a deadly enemy of Israel has a very long history.

Finally, a note about the dates given in the timelines of Parts 2 nd 3. I came across several instances in which sources diverged from one another in what should have been a solid fact - dates. In some instances, one-day difference in the recorded date could be attributed to time-zone differential. In other cases the differences boil down to a question of definition. If a given source cites date D for "USSR-Egypt arms deal", then this date may be defined as the date on which (i) an intent was announced, or (ii) negotiations began, or (iii) negotiation were concluded, or (iv) the deal was signed, or (v) the governments ratified the signed agreement, or (vi) arms were actually shipped, or (vii) the delivery arrived. The difference could amount to many months.

In a number of cases I was unable to reconcile the differences among the various sources I used. The conclusion is that the data I present in Parts 2 and 3 should be used with caution, notwithstanding my best efforts to ensure accuracy.
Posted by Joseph Alexander Norland at June 6, 2005 08:06 AM
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